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New frontiers of regulation: domestic work, working conditions and the 
holistic assessment of non-standard work norms 
 
Deirdre McCann
1
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Performed in the domestic sphere, characterised by caring labour and profoundly gendered, 
domestic work has long been emblematic of informality, its capacity for legal regulation 
dismissed or disregarded. Yet an evolving trend of national regulatory intervention has 
recently shifted to the international level, as domestic work has become the subject of a 
debate on the extension of EU norms to domestic workers and of an International Labour 
Organization (ILO) standard-setting process that generated the Domestic Work Convention, 
2001 (No 189) and Recommendation (No. 201). This paper examines these regulatory 
projects, which are poised at the nexus of human rights and labour law.  
 
The paper responds to the flourishing of domestic work regulation as an opportunity to assess 
the status of working conditions rights in the project of ‘non-standard’ work (NSW) 
regulation. It builds on an ongoing research project that is tracing the contemporary global 
evolution of working conditions regulation,
2
 with a focus on wages, working hours and 
work/family reconciliation, and on a contribution to the ILO standard-setting.
3
 The starting 
point of the paper is that the research literature on precarious work and substantive measures 
designed to protect non-standard workers (NSWs) are now sufficiently evolved to integrate 
their findings and advances into analyses of the “mainstream” of labour law and its sub-fields. 
 
A category of both labour law and human rights discourses, the status of working conditions 
rights haunts both of these legal fields. In the labour law sphere, working conditions 
protections are routinely subordinated to other goals, whether growth objectives, in the 
economic and development literatures, or, in legal analyses, protections designated, according 
to a range of criteria, to be ‘fundamental.’ More recently, however, the contemporary 
backdrop to labour law debates – the repercussions of the global financial crisis – has 
prompted a reformulation of discourses on the role of working conditions regulation, 
including as part of a concern to promote ‘job quality.’ In the field of human rights, 
conditions of work have been assigned a secondary  status among social rights that parallels 
the more contentious, and more frequently explored, subordination of social rights to civil 
and political rights.
4
 Recently, however, the concepts and language of human rights have 
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permeated labour law’s engagement with working conditions, and the intersections of these 
fields are being identified.
5
 This paper, then, is situated at the nexus of the discourses of 
“precariousness,” “job quality,” and “just and favourable” working conditions.  
 
To situate domestic work in the evolution of conditions of work regulation, the paper first 
examines key policy discourses within the transnational arenas, emanating from the ILO (the 
twin Declarations and Global Jobs Pact), the World Bank (the ‘Employing Workers’ 
dimension of the Doing Business project) and the European Union (the European 
Employment Strategy). Section One explores the recent history of conditions of work in these 
regulatory arenas, including the evolution of the relevant policy discourses in the wake of the 
crisis. Section Two examines two transnational-level projects of domestic work regulation 
mentioned earlier: the debates on the exclusion of domestic workers from key European 
Union (EU) working conditions standards and the ILO standard-setting on domestic work. 
Two themes are singled out to underpin these projects: an evolving notion of working 
conditions rights as fundamental, and the particular resonance of legal frameworks on 
domestic work to the evolution of regulatory strategies of conditions of work. Both are 
argued to challenge policy makers and researchers to attend to the interplay of precarious 
work regulation and mainstream working conditions norms. 
 
 
1. The transnational regulatory policy debates: working conditions in post-crisis 
 labour law 
 
A crucial, but generally overlooked, insight into early twenty-first century labour law is that it 
can be conceptualised as a struggle over the role and significance of regulatory frameworks 
on conditions of work: their objectives, their implications for growth strategies, the relative 
effectiveness of the available regulatory strategies, the status of the entitlements that these 
laws embody, and particularly whether these rights can be subordinated to economic goals.
6
 
Conflicting assertions on the significance and modes of regulating wages, working hours and 
work/family entitlements frame contemporary labour law reform, even if implicitly, across 
the globe.
7
  
 
Over the last decade, however, conditions of work have attained a particular prominence, and 
exhibited distinct dynamics, at the transnational levels, where they are embodying broader 
conflicts over the necessity of ensuring acceptable working conditions and the role of legal 
regulation in realising this goal. This assertion can be illustrated by considering the status and 
evolution of working conditions within the employment policy discourses of three of the 
central transnational forums: the International Labour Organization, World Bank and 
European Union. Although the evolution of these transnational policy fields is considered 
elsewhere in more detail,
8
 it is worth briefly reviewing in this context. The purpose is to set 
the scene for the subsequent discussion of conditions of work in the regulation of domestic 
work, by illustrating the significance of working conditions to contemporary policy on labour 
market regulation. The particular focus is on how these discourses have evolved in the wake 
of the global financial crisis. 
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Until relatively recently, conditions of work were strikingly subordinate within the guiding 
policy discourses of the International Labour Organization. The identification of select 
international labour standards as “core” in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (1998) propelled ILO regulatory strategy into the human rights debates on the 
indivisibility of the human rights canon and the subordination of social to civil and political 
rights.
9
 This debate embraced the status of working conditions rights, which were variously 
argued to be a fundamental element of an indivisible human rights canon, illegitimately 
exiled by core/non-core thinking,
10
 or effectively sustained by the core standards, as an 
outcome of the “procedural” right to collectively bargain.11 Whatever the merits of these 
various contentions, it is apparent that conditions of work were not at the forefront of the 
ILO’s contributions to the policy debates on economic globalization.12 
 
The era of the core/non-core debates in the ILO coincided with an incursion of the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) into the field of labour law that has shaped 
international and domestic policy discourses on conditions of work. The quantification and 
ranking of domestic labour law regimes in the World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) project13 
can be addressed as the forceful entry of the Bank into the domain of labour law, a threat to 
the  position of the ILO as the pre-eminent source of guidance on labour market regulation at 
the international level, or as a contribution to the evolving methodologies for the 
quantification and comparison of labour law regimes.
14
 It is, equally, an extension of the 
international-level flexibility narrative more firmly to grasp conditions of work regulation, 
through the project’s Employing Workers Index (EWI) and the translation of its outcomes 
into policy guidance that promotes deregulated markets.
15
 The Doing Business project co-
opted the core/non-core narrative, with the kinds of outcomes feared by the critics of the 1998 
Declaration. At the level of methodology, the EWI subjects only certain elements of labour 
law frameworks, and none of the core entitlements, to quantification and ranking. The 
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accompanying policy literature has extolled the core norms, while depicting other legal 
entitlements as harbourers of damaging economic impacts that are particularly unsuited to 
developing economies.
16
 
 
During this period, the European Union was the transnational arena in which the 
incorporation of job quality objectives into employment policy discourse was most 
vigorously pursued. The EU policy mechanism, the European Employment Strategy (EES), 
aspires to the harmonisation of Member State employment policies through a ‘soft law’ 
approach, which encompasses benchmarking, information dissemination and EU-level 
guidance on the coordination of national employment policies.
17
 Articulated as a guiding 
objective of the Union’s overarching ‘Lisbon Strategy’ (2000-2009),18 an aspiration for ‘more 
and better jobs’ was integrated into the employment policy regime. Here, it was translated 
into guidance to Member States from the European Commission that assumed the 
indivisibility of job quality and employment creation, 
 
Efforts to raise employment rates go hand in hand with improving the attractiveness 
of jobs [and] quality at work….19  
 
Although in effect the quality dimension was downgraded during the life of the Lisbon 
Strategy,
20
  it nonetheless remained in the concrete policy discourses and guidance, including 
in specific reference to conditions of work: to increase employment, ‘[t]he quality of jobs, 
including pay and benefits, working conditions, access to lifelong learning and career 
prospects, are crucial….’21 
 
More recently, and particularly after the financial crisis and subsequent recession, a 
substantial reframing of these three central transnational policy narratives has been evident, 
which has encompassed a reassessment of the role and status of legal frameworks on 
conditions of work. The ILO’s 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization,22 
although characterised as “drawing on and reaffirming” its 1998 antecedent, suggests a 
consensus to avert the more hazardous implications of the core/non-core dichotomy. The 
range of objectives identified by the ILO as its contemporary preoccupations (the “strategic 
objectives” of fundamental principles and rights at work, employment, social protection, 
social dialogue
23
) are characterised in the 2008 Declaration as “equally important” (I.A) and 
“inseparable” (I.B). Further, the Declaration sharpens the earlier, strikingly narrow, 
conception of social protection, which had been substantially equated with social security 
                                                 
16
 Lee and McCann, supra note 13. 
17
 See further Janine Goetschy, The Lisbon Strategy and Social Europe: Two Closely Linked Destinies, in 
EUROPE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE LISBON AGENDA 74-90 (MJ Rodriguez ed 2009). 
18
 See, for example, Mark Smith, Brendan Burchell, Colette Fagan and Catherine O’Brien, Job Quality in 
Europe 39(6) Industrial Relations Journal 586 (2008). 
19
 Council Decision of 15 July 2008 on Guidelines for the Employment Policies of the Member States 
2008/618/EC. 
20
 Martina Dieckhoff and Duncan Gallie The Renewed Lisbon Strategy and Social Exclusion Policy 38(6) 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS JOURNAL 480 (2007); Smith et al, supra note 18. 
21
 Council Decision of 15 July 2008, supra note 19, Guideline 17.1. 
22
 The 2008 Declaration follows its 1998 antecedent and the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia as the third 
“major statement of principles and policies” since the founding of the International Labour Organization. On the 
2008 Declaration generally, see Maupin, supra note 9. 
23
 The ILO’s work has been centred on the four strategic objectives since the International Labour Office’s 
March 1998 budget proposal. The four objectives were subsequently elaborated as the conduits to decent 
work: ILO DECENT WORK (1999). 
 5 
systems and largely excluded working conditions beyond health and safety.
24
 It explicitly 
refers to conditions of work, which are enshrined - in a meaningful reversion to the language 
of the Declaration of Philadelphia - as a call for, 
 
[P]olicies in regard to wages and earnings, hours and other conditions of work 
calculated to ensure a just share of the fruits of progress to all and a minimum living 
wage to all employed and in need of such protection.
25
 
 
The 2008 Declaration, then, returned working conditions to the central ILO discourse on 
economic globalisation. This stance has since been confirmed in the wake of the financial 
crisis, in the Organization’s 2009 Global Jobs Pact (although accompanied by a degree of 
uncertainty on the role and design of legal regulation that is examined in detail elsewhere).
26
  
 
The legal dimension of the ILO’s work has also offered a distinct conceptualisation of 
conditions of work, which parallels that of the policy sphere. In this context, working 
conditions rights have been framed within a human rights discourse; a discursive shift that 
can be read as part of a broader intensification of labour law’s engagement with the language, 
concepts and institutions of human rights law.
27
 This theme is most prominent in the 2005 
General Survey
28
 of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations on the ‘parent’ working time standards, the Hours of Work Conventions, 
Nos. 1
29
 and 30.
30
 The General Survey reviewed the conformity of ILO member State 
regulatory regimes with Convention Nos. 1 and 30 and the prospects for the ratification and 
implementation of these standards. In making this assessment, the Committee explicitly 
adopted the language of human rights.
31
 The report reframes the ILO Constitution’s support 
for hours of work  regulation with a “’human rights’ perspective,” which it elaborates as a 
notion of universality: 
 
[E]very worker in the global economy should be entitled to a certain standard 
concerning maximum duration of her or his work as well as minimum duration of 
rest, and should be entitled to such protection regardless of where she or he happens 
to be born or to live.
32
  
 
This assertion was bolstered by a reference to the working time standards of the international 
human rights instruments.
33
 
 
During the period in which ILO policy and legal discourses were being reassessed and 
reframed, the Doing Business project has been subject to intense criticism, both external
34
 
                                                 
24
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and by the Bank’s independent review body, the Independent Evaluation Group. 35  In 
response, the Project is in the throes of being refashioned in design and function, and 
repackaged at the discursive level, with outcomes that remain as yet uncertain. The Bank 
disowned the 2009 iteration of the EWI
36
 by announcing that it did not reflect World Bank 
policy, suspending its use in country-level policy advice,
37
 temporarily removing it from the 
overall DBI score, relegating it to an annex in the project’s annual reports38 and subjecting it 
to a revision that is ongoing.
39
   
 
These developments are pursued in more detail elsewhere.
40
 For present purposes, the most 
significant element in this overhaul is the evolution of the Bank’s treatment of working 
conditions. Efforts to reform the EWI have involved a rethink of the core/non-core paradigm, 
which is paralleling the ILO’s reassessment. In this case, incremental changes to the EWI (in 
particular in the 2010 Doing Business report
41
), have prompted the Bank to assert the 
conformity of the Index with the expanse of relevant ILO standards, including those on 
conditions of work. While the accuracy of this claim is doubtful (and the capacity of the Bank 
to render it questionable), the recourse to the ILO standards raises the profile of conditions of 
work within the DB legal policy discourses. Perhaps more significantly, the Bank’s ongoing 
efforts to develop a ‘Worker Protection Indicator’ (WPI), which would incorporate regulatory 
frameworks on conditions of work, suggest a degree of acceptance of regulatory objectives 
that extend beyond facilitating the “business environment.” 
 
Finally, post-crisis EU-level policy has confirmed the prior trajectory of the EU’s social 
policy project
42
 by formalising the displacement of job quality at the level of policy discourse. 
In recent years, the elaboration of conditions of work in EU employment policy has been 
subsumed in the articulation of the successor to the Lisbon Strategy, christened ‘Europe 
2020.’43  Crafted in the inhospitable aftermath of the crisis, the Europe 2020 strategy is 
characterised by a downplaying of conditions of work, which has been explicitly 
subordinated to economic goals. Europe 2020 is underpinned by a mantra of ‘sustainable and 
inclusive growth,’ which aligns EU employment policy ever more firmly with the neoliberal 
tenor of the Union’s guidance on economic strategy.44 A job quality objective remains in the 
Commission’s guidelines for national employment policies, although in muted and narrowed 
terms, 
                                                                                                                                                        
34
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The quality of jobs and employment conditions should be addressed. Member 
States should combat in-work poverty
45
 and promote occupational health and 
safety.
46
 
 
Work-life balance policies are also alluded to, incorporating a reference to innovation in work 
organisation, yet are forcefully aligned with supply-side objectives.
47
 These developments in 
the employment policy sphere have been paired with ongoing efforts to reform the EU’s 
‘hard law’ on working conditions, which are returned to in Section Two. 
 
 
2. Towards a holistic assessment of non-standard work norms: conditions of work 
 in the domestic work project 
 
The previous Section has assessed the recent evolution of working conditions regulation by 
analysing a set of transnational legal policy discourses that directly address this dimension of 
working life. The central purpose of this paper, however, is to suggest that a novel approach 
be injected into such analyses, which is capable of enriching and refining them. The central 
contention is that this legal landscape should be conceptualised as in part determined by the 
presence of working conditions in the regulatory treatment and policy discourses of non-
standard work; that the nature and effects of conditions of work regulation, and by extension 
of labour law as a whole, must be understood to be in part defined by the legal treatment of 
non-standard workers. In consequence, the research on any sub-field of labour market 
regulation, it is argued, should no longer focus exclusively on what may be termed 
‘mainstream’ norms: those legal instruments that are generally-applicable across the labour 
force as a whole. Instead, it should be expanded to embrace those measures specifically 
tailored to govern some (or all) of the various forms of ‘non-standard’ work. 
 
This conceptual strategy can be suggested to have a number of assets. First, it would expand 
the analysis of the sub-field of working conditions regulation to embrace the regulatory 
norms that govern the most vulnerable workers, including the vast part of the labour force in 
low-income settings and a substantial proportion of women in most countries. The holistic 
approach would thereby elicit a more accurate and comprehensive understanding of the 
evolution of the field than would an exclusive preoccupation with mainstream norms. 
Secondly, this strategy would nudge the precarious work literature towards assessing the 
trend towards NSW regulation across a more expansive geography, by assessing its place 
within labour law edifices as a whole. In consequence, this scholarly project could investigate 
the implications of NSW frameworks for mainstream norms. NSW regulation is continuing to 
evolve, in scope and substance, in an era in which labour law’s conventional protective 
frameworks and techniques are subject to pressures that at least stall their evolution and 
perhaps threaten their survival. An intuition pursued in this paper is that NSW regulation can 
therefore be expected to exercise an influence on the content of mainstream norms, in the 
post-crisis urge for legal reform and beyond. The purpose of this paper is to draw on these 
                                                 
45
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insights by investigating the precarious work/working conditions nexus as it emerges in the 
regulation of domestic work.  
 
Recent research on national labour law regimes has confirmed domestic work to be subject to 
a widespread exclusion from labour law frameworks, which can be attributed to the 
intersection of its gendered complexion, as a highly feminised work-form, and its location, in 
the private home.
48
 As a result, domestic work has been constrained within regulatory 
paradigms that assume its ‘exceptionalism,’ as a form of  labour market engagement unsuited 
to the standard array of labour law protections. In recent decades, however, and in particular 
in the wake of the heightened recourse to outsourced care work in advanced industrialised 
countries, and evolving efforts in developing countries to improve the quality of informal 
employment, concentrated efforts have been made to regulate domestic work. The outcomes 
embrace elaborate regulatory regimes in both the industrialised world, perhaps most notably 
in France and Switzerland,
49
 and in low-income settings, including pioneering statutory 
frameworks in South Africa and Uruguay.
50
 Most recently, the impulse to regulate domestic 
work has surfaced at the international level, to produce the ILO Domestic Work Convention, 
2001 (No 189) and Recommendation (No. 201) in July 2011. 
 
This project of domestic work regulation can be argued to open up twin frontiers of 
regulation. First, and most evidently, if the various forms of NSW, drawing on Vosko,
51
 can 
be conceptualised according to a typology of displacement from the SER, domestic work 
frameworks extends the regulatory project more firmly to embrace divergence along the axis 
of location. To illustrate, the ILO’s episodic project of NSW regulation first addressed 
locational displacement from the SER in the homeworking standards, Convention No. 177
52
 
and Recommendation No. 184,
53
 to embrace waged labour carried out in the worker’s home. 
The new standards on domestic work extend this intervention, by legitimating regulation of 
wage-work relationships in which the home/workplace belongs to the employer.   
 
It is the contention of this paper, however, that the domestic work project should be 
understood to open a second, less readily apparent, frontier of regulatory engagement. 
Domestic work standards, it is argued, are addressing the regulation of conditions of work 
more elaborately than prior NSW initiatives. Earlier NSW frameworks have been criticised 
for their deficient embrace of working conditions. Vosko has highlighted, for example, the 
cursory treatment of working time in the ILO’s homework standards, despite the excessive 
hours associated with piecework having featured prominently in the preceding debates.
54
 In 
contrast, this paper argues, conditions of work has a striking intensity in the domestic work 
project, at both the discursive level and in regulatory design. Further, the potential for 
heightened global regulatory intervention on domestic work, in the wake of the ILO standards, 
suggests the urgency of directing research attention towards the status and configuration of 
conditions of work in the domestic work project.  
                                                 
48
 ILO, DECENT WORK FOR DOMESTIC WORKERS (2010). 
49
 See Manuela Tomei, Decent Work for Domestic Workers: An Achievable Goal or Wishful Thinking? in 
REGULATING FOR DECENT WORK. NEW DIRECTIONS IN LABOUR MARKET REGULATION 
(Sangheon Lee and Deirdre McCann eds. 2011). 
50
 ILO, supra note 48. 
51
 LEAH VOSKO, MANAGING THE MARGINS: GENDER, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATION OF PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT (2010). 
52
 Homework Convention, 1996 (No. 177). 
53
 Homework Recommendation, 1996 (No. 184). 
54
 ILO, DOCUMENTS OF THE MEETING OF EXPERTS ON THE SOCIAL PROTECTION OF 
HOMEWORKERS (1990). 
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This paper responds to that need by assessing two prominent transnational regulatory projects 
of contrasting fates. The first is the stalled regulatory project on the reform of the EU 
Pregnant Workers Directive.
55
 The second, the standard-setting process that culminated in the 
adoption of the ILO instruments on domestic workers. In doing so, the paper highlights the 
central regulatory strategies on NSW that characterise these projects. These strategies are 
categorised as: (1) expansion: the extension of generally-applicable norms to cover NSWs; (2) 
equal treatment: the introduction of legal entitlements for NSWs to be accorded equal 
treatment to comparable SER workers; and (3) specific regulation: the design of regulatory 
measures and techniques tailored to the specificities of the individual NS work-forms. 
Drawing on this typology, it is argued that the domestic work project is offering at least two 
contributions to the evolution of working conditions regulation: (1) in the expansion strategy, 
an elaboration of working conditions entitlements as fundamental (Section 2.1); and (2) in the 
specific regulation model, the development of strategies for the regulation of working 
conditions that can be expected to influence mainstream norms (Section 2.2). 
 
2.1 The expansion strategy: working conditions entitlements as ‘fundamental’ 
 
EU labour market policy actors are currently enmeshed in a set of interlinked regulatory 
reform processes that are propelled by an asserted need to reform the Union’s working 
conditions standards. Poised between the language of social protection and a discourse of the 
urgent need for ‘modernisation’ of European labour law structures,56 these reform efforts 
impinge on domestic work regulation through a debate on the deployment of the expansion 
strategy, and in particular the extension of the Pregnant Workers’ Directive (PWD)57 to cover 
domestic workers.  
 
The contention of this paper is that these legislative reform efforts are of some significance to 
the evolution of working conditions regulation. Indeed, their influence extends beyond the 
EU to other transnational and national legal policy settings. Shadowing its role in shaping 
legal regimes across the Member States, the EU legal order is a global model, which feeds 
into the contemporary international processes that circulate labour law strategies and 
frameworks. Despite the unique aspects of EU labour laws as a transnational minimum 
“frame,” designed to be fleshed out by diverse national regimes, its standards and regulatory 
techniques exercise a direct influence on domestic policy debates and legal instruments 
across the world.
58
 This paper argues that the EU debates on the legal treatment of domestic 
workers offer to this global audience a notion of working conditions entitlements as 
fundamental. This fundamentality narrative, in turn, offers a range of insights that illuminate 
understanding contemporary labour law, including on the preservation of working conditions 
in deteriorating regulatory projects, the ongoing engagement of labour law and human rights, 
and the evolving legal narratives of acceptable conditions of work.  
 
                                                 
55
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58
 On the influence of the EU instruments on non-standard work in Korea, for example, see SANGHEON LEE 
AND BYUNG-HEE LEE, MIND THE GAPS: NON-REGULAR EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MAREKT 
SEGMENTATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2009). 
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The ascription of fundamentality to conditions of work, this paper suggests, has its origins in 
a project that has been pursued over the last two decades through the Union’s ‘atypical work’ 
standards, a package of three measures – the Part-time Work (PTWD),59 Fixed-term Work 
(FTWD)
60
 and Temporary Agency Work Directives (TAWD)
61
 – that employ merged 
equality/specific regulation models to establish Europe-wide minimum standards for these 
forms of NSW.
62
 The contention is that the origins of the fundamentality narrative can be 
identified in the regulatory logic of the most recent of these NSW instruments, the 2008 
TAWD.
63
 It is instructive, it can be suggested, to consider the TAWD framework in some 
detail. This instrument has been analysed to address it implications for the regulation of 
NSW.
64
 This piece offers a reassessment of the TAWD, which centres on its relevance to the 
evolution of legal narratives on conditions of work. The aim is to set the scene for a 
consideration of the intersection of NSW/working conditions regulation in the domestic work 
debates. 
 
The TAWD follows the pattern of its predecessors by mandating equal treatment for TAWs 
with an SER comparator, in this case a directly-hired employee. The Directive diverges from 
the earlier instruments, however, by rendering working conditions the linchpin of its equality 
strategy. The PTWD
65
 and FTWD
66
 mandate an open-ended entitlement to equal treatment. 
The TAWD, in contrast, is narrowed by the articulation of its central entitlement: it assures 
TAWs only the same “basic working and employment conditions” (BWEC) that would apply 
if they had been directly recruited.
67
 The Directive’s elaboration of BWEC, moreover, 
confines the equality entitlement to four dimensions of working conditions - working time, 
pay,
68
 protective measures for pregnant and breast-feeding workers,
69  
and access to the 
employer’s child-care facilities,70 although equal treatment has also been required under EU 
health and safety instruments since 1991.
71
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 Council Directive (EC) 97/81 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, 
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60
 Council Directive (EC) 99/70 concerning the Framework Agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, 
UNICE and CEEP [1999] OJ L175/43. 
61
 Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 on Temporary 
Agency Work OJ L372, 5 December 2008, p. 9.  
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70
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temporary employment relationship [1991] OJ L 206/19. Directive 91/383 was the sole product of early efforts 
to regulate TAW at the EU level.  
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It has been observed that the BWEC model denotes a narrowing of the EU legal project on 
atypical work.
72
 Perhaps most notably, TAWs can legitimately be restricted in accessing the 
training and promotion opportunities that are available to the client’s direct-hire employees, 
despite such opportunities being likely to improve the quality of TAW and the opportunities 
available to its incumbents. Nor can TAWs demand employment security, irrespective of the 
duration of their tenure with a client. The FTWD contains a ‘standardising’ strategy73 that 
requires fixed-term contracts to be deemed of indefinite duration
74
 after a specified period
75
 
The conversion of tripartite arrangements to direct-hire contracts, however, is not required by 
the TAWD, and TAWs are excluded from the coverage of the FTWD.
76
 
 
Crucial to gauging the health of the EU regulatory project on NSW, the TWAD is equally 
essential to evaluating the Union’s contemporary rendering of conditions of work regulation. 
In this guise, the Directive can be argued to offer a distinct, but complementary, account of 
the BWEC model. That is, by configuring working conditions as the extent of equal treatment 
obligations across the NS workforce, and discarding other compelling options, the Directive 
has characterised working conditions entitlements as fundamental. This articulation of the 
fundamental, further, was underpinned by a recourse to the human rights dimension of the 
EU. The Directive hitches the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the cause of NSW regulation, 
in an assertion that it is designed to ensure compliance with Article 31 (“fair and just working 
conditions”).77 The TAWD thus revealed the incipient influence of the human rights narrative 
in regulating NSW in the EU. 
 
The Directive offered an intriguing account of legal entitlements on working conditions, 
given their legacy of exclusion from international-level elaborations of the fundamental. It is 
a model that holds some promise for the substantive future of working conditions protections, 
even if most useful in supporting the retention of these rights as the minima of crumbling 
regulatory frameworks (its function, in essence, in the NSW regime). For labour law’s 
broader engagement with human rights, moreover, the TAWD suggested the longstanding 
subordination of working conditions within the human rights canon, addressed elsewhere,
78
 
to be eroding. 
 
The BWEC schema as a model for fundamental working conditions rights, however, harbours 
certain risks to the protective strength of working conditions regulation, which hint at the 
broader risks that can potentially be posed by NSW frameworks to the mainstream of labour 
law. By singling out working time, wages, and HS as the legitimate objects of equality, the 
EU NSW regime has bifurcated working conditions entitlements into fundamental rights, on 
which equal treatment is required, and second-tier protections, on which equal treatment is 
discretionary. Such bifurcation strategies inevitably trigger objections of the kind levelled at 
the ILO’s core/non-core experiment. The most compelling, from the international experience. 
They risk exiling elements of labour law’s canon of protections to hostile territory, where 
they can fall prey to neoliberalism’s taste for rights that cannot lay claim to fundamentality. 
 
                                                 
72
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74
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Even if the merit of legal strategies that rank working conditions protections is conceded, 
reservations remain about the imagery of fundamental rights offered by the TAW regime. 
This elaboration of decent working conditions is strikingly constrained. Its flaw is the 
restriction of the work/family dimension of the equality entitlement to health and safety and 
childcare. The consequence is that the Directive hosts a model of conditions of work - hours, 
wages, HS – that is strikingly narrow; indeed, comparable to the one that underpinned the 
first ILO standards in 1919. This equality model is also outmoded. By excluding the bulk of 
work/family entitlements, the TAWD is adrift from European labour law’s frameworks and 
discourses as they have been galvanised in recent decades by the absorption of work/family 
reconciliation as a regulatory objective.
79
 The EU regime withholds from TAWs (in the 
absence of Member State intervention) all national and lower-level maternity and parental 
entitlements beyond the EU-level minima. This excludes all national (and lower-level) 
entitlements that extend beyond the relevant EU Directives, including the paternity and paid 
parental leave schemes that feature in a number of labour law regimes across Europe.
80
 Nor 
does the Directive embrace entitlements to request adjustments in working hours, despite 
their appearance, albeit in non-binding form, in the Part-Time Work Directive.
81
 TAWs are 
therefore impeded in benefiting from the last decade’s primary innovations in work/family 
and working time regulation.
82
  
 
This reassessment of the TAWD, by clarifying the implications of Europe’s transnational 
NSW regime for conditions of work regulation, sets the scene for an assessment of the 
unfolding of the EU-level regulation of domestic work. To begin with an overarching 
observation, the rapid progress towards ILO standards on domestic work has left the EU 
exposed. It retains a legal framework now discredited at the international level: one in which 
domestic workers are excluded from generally-applicable norms. On a global scale, the EU 
labour law regime is not an outlier. The evidence on national regulatory frameworks 
generated by the ILO standard-setting project has revealed labour law regimes across the 
world to have conceptualized domestic work as a unique work-form, inherently unsuited to 
regulation.
83
 Further, this research reveals the exclusionary model to have had a particular 
resonance in the field of working conditions laws. Even where domestic workers are covered 
by most generally-applicable laws, they are often specifically excluded from the coverage of 
working conditions laws.
84
 
 
The EU’s labour law framework is of this type. Although it has not attracted comment in the 
scholarly literatures, the exclusionary strategy is strikingly prominent in EU instruments on 
conditions of work. Uniquely among NSWs, domestic workers are specifically excluded from 
the coverage of key working conditions EU instruments, namely the Working Time Directive 
(WTD) and the maternity protection standard, the Pregnant Workers Directive (PWD).
85
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These exclusions emerge from the political settlement that grounded EU working conditions 
laws in the realm of health and safety (HS).
86
 Its consequence is that the HS ‘Framework’ 
Directive 89/391
87
 governs the scope of central working conditions Directives and ties the 
working conditions instruments to the broader exclusion of domestic workers from the HS 
regime.  
 
The initial proposal for Directive 89/391 reflected a commitment on the part of the European 
Commission to an expansive coverage for European HS standards (CEC 1988). The 
Commission observed that HS frameworks in a number of Member States excluded private 
households and domestic-service employees, and highlighted the broad scope of its own 
proposal, to cover sectors and forms of work frequently excluded from, or inadequately 
addressed in, national laws.
88
 The proposed Directive implicitly included domestic workers,
89
 
offering expansive definitions of both ‘the  workplace’ (“any place to which the worker has 
access in the undertaking and/or establishment”) and “the worker” (“any person who 
performs work in some form, including students undergoing training and apprentices”).90 
This expansive approach, however, was jettisoned during the legislative process, generating a 
Directive pared more closely to align with the conventional parameters of HS legislation. As 
a result, although Directive 89/391 defines its coverage relatively broadly, it singles out 
domestic workers as its sole explicit exclusion.
91
 They are consequently excluded from the 
Directive’s progeny, including the WTD and PWD.  
 
In recent years, however, these exclusions have triggered a skirmish among the EU 
institutions over whether the expansion strategy should be used to reform the health and 
safety regime. This dispute is being pursued as part of broader efforts to refashion the EU 
working conditions norms, and has emerged with particular clarity in a process of revision of 
the PWD initiated by the European Commission in 2008.
92
 The initial Commission proposal 
omitted any reference to domestic workers,
93
 prompting the European Parliament to call for 
the PWD to be broadened in scope. This effort returned to an enduring theme of the 
Parliament’s work: as far back as the millennium, its Resolution on Regulating Domestic 
Help in the Informal Economy had called for domestic work to be brought within the ambit of 
legislation and collective agreements at both Member State and EU-level. This assertion was 
subsequently channelled directly towards working conditions reform, and most expansively 
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(2001).  
87
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articulated in the Parliament’s response to the Commission’s HS strategy for 2007-2012,94 in 
a Resolution of 15 January 2008. The Resolution called on the Commission and Member 
States to amend the HS Directives to govern “at-risk” professions, including domestic work.95 
It was subsequently fashioned into a proposal for legislative design, in a call for the PWD 
explicitly to cover domestic workers (to extend to “pregnant workers employed under any 
type of contract, including domestic work”).96  
 
These debates are pertinent to the project that is pursued in this paper, of tracing the 
intersection of NSW and conditions of work regulation. Centrally, they can be argued to 
solidify, in the discourses of EU labour law policy, the ascription of fundamental status to 
working conditions entitlements. Further, this recourse to fundamentality is itself more firmly 
tethered to human rights discourse. The domestic work debates thus bolster the innovations 
identified earlier in the regulatory framework on TAW. As an illustration, to contend that HS 
entitlements should extend to the entire labour force, the 2008 Resolution melded an assertion 
of the human rights status of working conditions entitlements with the imagery of an EU-
level floor of legislated rights.  
 
[S]uch protection is ultimately founded on the fundamental right to physical 
integrity, and …. opt-outs from OHS protection legislation jeopardise the health 
of workers and equal opportunities and may trigger a downward trend in such 
protection.
97
    
 
Whether this language of fundamentality will crystallise into concrete outcomes remains to 
be seen. So far, the Commission has resisted pressure to adjust its proposals to envisage a 
revised PWD that would embrace domestic workers. More recently, the reform of the PWD 
has been stalled by the recession’s dampening effects on working conditions regulation.98 
Certainly, rationales can readily be identified for expanding the personal scope of the HS 
Directives, even if confined within the parameters of EU discourse. There is a straightforward 
argument to be made, for example, that the extension of these norms would be as likely as the 
TAWD to further compliance with Article 31 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights. Further, 
the adoption of the ILO domestic workers standards seems to have prompted the Commission 
to soften its tone on the expansion strategy, and even to hint at future initiatives towards 
specific regulation.
99
 Despite the indeterminacy of their outcomes, however, the point stands 
that the domestic work debates are reaffirming, and perhaps even strengthening, the 
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fundamentality and human rights narratives that were previously encountered in the NSW 
regime. It suggests, then, that the ascription of fundamentality to working conditions 
entitlements can be characterised as an enduring theme in the regulatory language of the EU. 
 
2.2 The specific regulation strategy: challenging mainstream norms? 
 
Paralleling the EU-level debates on the expansion strategy, the recent turn towards the 
specific regulation of domestic work should also be understood as a crucial contribution to 
the evolution of contemporary working conditions regulation. The specific regulation project 
intensifies the engagement of NSW laws with conditions of work, as both a recurring feature 
of the debates and a prominent element of the emerging regulatory frameworks. This point 
can be substantiated by considering the most visible of the specific regulation instruments, 
the ILO’s Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) and Recommendation (No. 201).  
 
The ILO standards illustrate the second frontier of domestic work regulation identified in 
Section One, by engaging in detail with conditions of work regulation. The standards are not 
comprehensive. Most significantly, work/life reconciliation has a marginal presence.
100
 The 
treatment of working conditions in the domestic workers standards is substantial, however, 
when contrasted with the ILO’s earlier NSW instruments. The Convention embodies an 
overarching exhortation that domestic workers should enjoy “fair terms of employment as 
well as decent working conditions.”101 It also addresses in turn a set of central dimensions of 
conditions of work, namely abuse, harassment and violence,
102
 working time,
103
 wages
104
 and 
health and safety.
105
  
 
The prominence of working conditions in these standards, then, coincides with, and 
reinforces, its resurgence in the Organization’s post-crisis policy discourse (see further 
Section One above). The domestic workers standards have also, it will be argued in this 
Section, particularly substantial implications for assessing the intersection of NSW laws 
within mainstream working conditions norms. To illustrate this point, the remainder of this 
Section singles out a dimension of working conditions on which, it is argued, these standards 
have the potential to have a particularly meaningful influence, namely working time.    
 
Working hours are identified in the (rather sparse) empirical research as one of the myriad 
deficiencies of domestic work. Although much of the available data is drawn from small-
scale surveys, they suggest that domestic staff, globally, are particularly subject to excessive 
working hours
106
 and to unpredictable schedules.
107
 It has been argued elsewhere that it is 
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productive to situate the working time schedules within the preoccupations and analytical 
concepts of the mainstream working time literature.
108
 Most constructively, this strategy 
permits these schedules to be reconceptualised as forms of working time flexibility.  
 
In domestic work, conduits to working time flexibility are indispensable to addressing 
fluctuating and unpredictable care needs. Presently, however, this flexibility appears to be 
derived primarily from working time schedules that are now widely, if not uniformly, deemed 
unacceptable in other segments of the labour market. Domestic work has resisted working 
time regulation in part because it is widely understood to demand largely unconstrained 
availability. The prevailing characterisation of domestic work as ungovernable, is not 
exclusively derived from its location in the private sphere, but also from the narrative of its 
working hours as inescapably extensive. Recognising domestic work regulation as a stage in 
the progressive expansion in the occupational scope of working time laws, however, permits 
the temporal dimension of domestic work to be reformulated. Rather than an adjunct of the 
job, it is instead configured as an unrestrained version of employer-oriented working time 
flexibility, and therefore, most significantly, amenable to the regulatory mechanisms that 
constrain such flexibility. 
 
This outcome, however, demands novel regulatory strategies. The classical techniques of 
working time law - hours limits and minimum rest periods – can, to a degree, constrain 
working time flexibility, by curbing long hours. These methods feature in the Domestic 
Workers Convention, primarily as part of an equality strategy. The Convention requires 
ratifying member States to ensure that domestic workers are treated like “workers generally” 
with respect to normal hours, overtime compensation, daily and weekly rest, and paid annual 
leave.
109
 The Convention also contains a specific minimum standard for weekly rest, of 24 
consecutive hours.
110
 A key component of the long and unpredictable hours in domestic work, 
however, is the substantial presence of ‘on-call’ time: periods in which the worker is 
available to the employer without engaging in the primary activities of the job.
111
 Even when 
long hours are framed as a strategy for working time flexibility, on-call work remains a 
regulatory challenge, beyond the reach of conventional strategies. Further, its 
conceptualization in regulatory frameworks has long been observed to be ill-developed.
112
 
 
On-call periods, however, are gradually coming into focus. This advance has unfurled in the 
mainstream of working time regulation, in the context of a high-status profession, and the 
highly regulated labour markets, of western Europe. On-call time surfaced at the EU level 
when the WTD was extended to cover the health sector, in the shape of a contention that the 
sector cannot be framed by the constraints of the Directive’s maximum 48 hour working 
hours limit. For this reason, the on-call hours of hospital doctors should not count towards the 
hours limit. This dispute has culminated in an EU-level standoff over the definition of 
working time in the WTD.  
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At variance with the regulatory strategy advocated by the European health sector lobby, a 
unitary model of working time was asserted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its 
rulings in Simap
113
 and Jaeger,
114
 in which it held that ‘internal’ on-call periods (performed 
on the premises of the employer) are working time and should therefore count towards the 
WTD’s weekly maximum.115 This unitary approach has since implicitly been endorsed by the 
ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(CEACR), which has clarified that the notion of working time in the international Hours of 
Work standards
116
 embraces on-call hours.
117
  The European Commission, in contrast, 
responded to the ECJ’s rulings by promoting a model in which working hours are bifurcated 
into ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ time, the latter equated with on-call hours and excluded from the 
computation of working hours, wages, or both. This model was included among the key 
reforms for the abortive 2004-2009 revision of the EU Working Time Directive
118
 and lingers 
in the Commission’s renewed proposals for reform.119  
 
Highlighting the affinities of the extensively regulated, male-dominated medical profession 
and the highly feminized and deregulated milieu of domestic work, the regulatory conundrum 
of on-call time is now being addressed in formalization strategies on domestic work. 
Domestic (statutory and bargained) frameworks offer both models. The bifurcation schema, 
for instance, is perhaps most prominent in the French Convention Collective Nationale des 
Employées de Maison, which extends the activity/inactivity duality to domestic workers in 
caring roles.
120
 The most prominent repository of the unitary approach is the South African 
Sectoral Determination No. 7 (SD 7), the key domestic work regime of the global South. 
Within this framework, ‘on-call hours’ are regulated, rather than by exclusion from the ambit 
of working time, by limiting their incidence and duration.
121
 
 
It has already been observed that in the project of domestic work regulation, these twin 
models for conceptualising and regulating on-call periods are becoming more precisely 
delineated, conspicuously opposed, and prominently available to integrate into broader 
projects of working time law reform.
122
 The central concern for the apt regulation of domestic 
work has also been identified, as the deficient protective strength of the bifurcation model. 
Domestic work frameworks that integrate the inactivity/activity duality bear a set of risks that 
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are associated with the bifurcation technique: the complexities of accurately classifying time 
periods, and, more significantly, long hours and lost wages.
123
 Yet the strategy also harbours 
more probing threats to the integrity of the SER’s working time dimension.124 Conceivably, it 
hosts a strategy for a legalized casualisation of jobs that do not involve discrete and 
delineated periods of on-call time. Harboured in the logic of this technique is the capacity to 
drain ‘slack time’ from the working day, by excluding certain ‘inactive’ periods from the 
definition of working time, thus mapping the ambit of remunerated time to the productive 
needs of the employer.
125
  
 
The new international standards on domestic workers offer an opportunity to assess which of 
the two vying models has the upper hand, with significant implications for the regulation of 
working time, in domestic work and beyond. Prior to their adoption, it was argued that the 
standards should integrate the unitary approach to working time, to cement this model in the 
face of substantial pressures to abandon it.
126
 The outcome, in stark contrast, is that the 
standards have shifted the ILO’s regulatory landscape towards an acceptance of the 
bifurcation strategy.  
 
This outcome stems from the solution brokered in Article 10(3) of the Convention, which 
provides that on-call (‘standby’) periods “shall be regarded as hours of work to the extent 
determined by national laws, regulations or collective agreements, or any other means 
consistent with national practice.”127 Convention No. 189, then, (1) envisages a continuum of 
viable regulatory strategies for the classification of on-call work and (2) devolves this 
selection to domestic policy actors. By deferring to domestic-level regulatory frameworks, it 
implicitly permits on-call hours to be discounted from working time, thereby legitimating the 
bifurcation model as a viable regulatory strategy. As a consequence, domestic workers are 
subject to less favourable treatment, with respect to their working hours, than both SER 
workers and NSWs who are covered by the Hours of Work Conventions. The latter 
constituencies can claim international-level commitment to the classification of on-call 
periods as working hours and, more broadly, to a unitary model of working time. The former 
are at the mercy of domestic-level regulatory selection, which can permissibly range along a 
continuum from full computation of on-call hours as working time to the comprehensive 
exclusion of these hours.  
 
The deference shown by the Domestic Workers Convention to domestic governments and 
social partner organizations sits uneasily with the Committee of Expert’s assertion of the 
unitary model under the Hours of Work standards. This discrepancy presumably can be 
explained by the genesis of the Article 10(3) formula. Rather than stemming from a 
widespread preference for the bifurcation strategy among the policy actors in the standard-
setting process, it appears to have been grounded in a misunderstanding of the drafting 
strategies that would be most likely to generate a desired regulatory outcome. Closer analysis 
reveals an assumption, reflected throughout the policy documents and debates, that the 
Article 10(3) formula requires on-call hours to be counted as working time. This 
                                                 
123
 Le Feuvre, supra note 120. 
124
 On the resonance of the SER for the regulation of working time precariousness, see McCann and Murray, 
supra note 3, at 26. 
125
 McCann and Murray, supra note 3, at 28-32. 
126
 Id. 
127
 The Recommendation offers a slightly different formula, of comparable effect, that member States “to the 
extent determined by national laws, regulations or collective agreements, should regulate” specified elements of 
standby hours, Clause 9.  
 19 
interpretation, contrary to any convincing reading of the text, was accepted from the earliest 
International Labour Office contribution
128
 to the ILC Committee debates. During the 2011 
ILC, for instance,  objections to Article 10(3) were voiced by the Employer’s Group and the 
government of India in order to oppose the mandatory ascription of on-call periods to 
working time, while it was defended by the Worker’s Group and the Brazilian and US 
governments, which wished to retain the unitary model.
129
  
 
These processes, then, reflect a failure on the part of the various actors involved to recognise 
the influence of drafting strategies in realising underlying policy objectives, and to 
countenance that the former might betray the latter. More tellingly, they can also be identified 
as part of a broader theme of regulatory uncertainty, which characterise the ILO’s recent legal 
policy interventions in the field of working conditions. This theme has been suggested 
elsewhere to be reflected in the ILO’s high-level policy discourse, in the Global Jobs Pact.130 
The treatment of on-call work in the domestic workers standards seems to confirm that, as 
working conditions have become more central to transnational legal policy, heightened 
acceptance of regulatory intervention by the policy and standard-setting organs of the ILO 
has been paired with a tentative grasp of the strategies and frameworks that are available to 
regulate this element of working life. This deficiency, it can be suggested, is weakening the 
Organization in the face of substantial external and internal pressures to dismantle its 
historical regulatory achievements. 
 
To tease out the possible implications of this treatment of on-call work for mainstream 
working time norms, it can be suggested that the domestic work standards have embedded a 
flaw in the ILS, which can be exploited to deregulatory ends. In particular, the Article 10(3) 
strategy is available to influence any future debates on the reform of the mainstream ILO 
working time regime. Such reform has been countenanced as an Organizational objective 
periodically over the last decade, most notably by the Committee of Experts in its 2005 
assessment of the Hours of Work Conventions,
131
 and, more recently, by a Tripartite Meeting 
of Experts on Working Time Arrangements, which was convened in October 2011 with the 
purpose of  devising “future ILO guidance” on working time.132 These developments could 
conceivably also inform EU debates on the definition of working time, if the care work 
affinities are identified.  
 
Much depends, then, on the unpredictable processes of reception of the international norms 
into domestic regimes, and their broader dissemination to cognate legal policy discourses, 
including those of other transnational arenas. These processes, it should be hoped, will reflect 
the spirit, rather than the letter, of the Convention. It is also possible that the discrepancy 
between the domestic workers and hours of work regimes could be reconciled by (highly) 
creative interpretative footwork by the Committee of Experts, towards reasserting a unitary 
model of working time across the body of the international standards. An alternate and 
conceivable future, however, is that the dissemination of the bifurcation strategy under the 
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auspices of the international standards will embed an insufficiently protective model, which 
will subsequently become difficult to displace.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has contended that the recent evolution of transnational-level policy discourses on 
labour regulation should be conceptualised, in part, as a struggle over the significance of legal 
regulation of working conditions. Framing the evolution of regulatory policy in this way 
confirms the ILO’s experiment in identifying core labour standards to have been neglectful of 
the role of regulation in pursuing decent working conditions. Similarly, the World Bank’s 
experiment in disseminating guidance on regulatory design through the EWI is exposed as a 
conduit for flexibility narratives that have tightened their hold on conditions of work laws. 
EU employment policy, in contrast, has merged job quality and employment creation goals, 
to forge a policy narrative receptive to the pursuit of decent  conditions of work. The paper 
has also suggested, however, that the financial crisis and ensuing recession have been 
associated with substantial, if incomplete, reformulations of these policy narratives. A central 
outcome has been the heightened presence of conditions of work at the international level, 
where it has been ushered closer to the heart of international policy discourses in the ILO’s 
2008 Declaration and Global Jobs Pact, and in the reform of the World Bank’s EWI. In 
contrast, the paper has highlighted the fading of the job quality objective in the employment 
policy discourses of the EU. 
 
It has further been suggested that to analyse the working conditions dimension of labour 
regulation without attending to legal frameworks on NSW generates a distorted picture of this 
regulatory terrain. Further, it misses crucial contributions to labour law’s conceptual 
underpinnings and technical strategies, which could enhance the protection of both the NS 
and SER labour forces. This potential has been explored in an examination of the evolution of 
the NSW project towards a new frontier for labour law: the regulation of domestic work. 
Within the EU’s ‘atypical work’ project, this development has been found to have reinforced 
an existing narrative of conditions of work protections as fundamental entitlements. The 
specific regulation of domestic work in the ILO standards has been suggested to have 
particular resonance for the evolution and dissemination of regulatory strategies on working 
conditions.  
 
These developments can be suggested to have implications for both policy and research. The 
post-recession resurgence of working conditions in key strands of transnational labour law 
policy, for example, could be reinforced by recourse to discourses and strategies drawn from 
the regulation of precarious work, as part of broader efforts to sustain the recession’s 
regulatory advances (such as the range of strategies that have been employed to avoid 
collective redundancies). This opening is ripe to be exploited by alert policy actors. For future 
research agendas, it has been suggested that it is worth attending to the interplay of precarious 
work regulation and mainstream norms. Such work would question whether the regulation of 
NSW is advancing cognate regulatory fields, including to curb precariousness within the 
frame of the SER. Otherwise, concerns should be raised for the elaboration of frameworks 
genuinely protective of the global precarious labour force, whether encased within the SER or 
in non-standard forms of labour market engagement.  
 
